Can Seeman defeat Vijay ?

NTK is consistent in its core ideology and issues, which is its biggest strength. This ensures that their core voter base will not dissipate. A lot of half-baked political analysts think that Vijay will take a bulk of Seeman's votes, but that is not the reality. In 2024, in addition to Seeman's core vote bank growth, it is true that some hardcore Vijay fans voted for Seeman since Vijay had supported the mic symbol before the election. Additionally, some people who don't like Congress, BJP, ADMK, or DMK also voted for him since there was no alternative like Kamal in 2021. It is only this section of votes that will take a hit.

How much will this be? Logically, Vijay can't take away more than 1.5% of Seeman's votes. In 2021, Seeman received 6.7% of the vote, even when Kamal Haasan, who had a clean image, provided an alternative to both national and Dravidian parties. At that time, Vijay fans were also angry with Seeman, and members of Vijay Makkal Iyakkam even put up street posters against Seeman because he teased Vijay for bowing down to EPS during the Sarkar issue. So, when there was an alternative like Kamal and hostility from Vijay fans, Seeman still managed to get 6.7%. That vote is not going to disappear. At most, he could lose 1.5% in 2026 (8.2% - 6.7%).

Can Seeman compensate for this vote loss? He certainly can. Seeman is likely to cross a double-digit vote share because of several factors. The first factor is the Arunthathiyar sub-categorization issue. All Dravidian and national parties support this, but Seeman is cleverly leveraging this issue using the "losers and gainers" theory. While everyone supports the gainers, the losers in this issue are the Tamil Paraiyar and Devendrar castes. Seeman is attempting to consolidate these votes by framing it as an injustice and proposing an increase in the SC employment quota by 5% to compensate for the 3% loss. On the ground, this approach is gaining significant appreciation among educated Tamil Paraiyar and Devendrar communities. This gives Seeman an advantage, especially as Vijay has made no comment on this matter.

In northern Tamil Nadu, polarization will occur. Seeman is trying to counter this by dividing the SC votes into Tamil SC and Telugu SC groups. He points out that ADMK has become a Vanniyar-dominated party (with the 10.5% reservation) and appeals to SC voters to support him instead. This strategy seems to be working on the ground. While Stalin receives the bulk of Tamil SC votes due to Thirumavalavan, Seeman has already positioned himself as a strong second in this voter base in 2024. His efforts will likely further increase his share of these votes, whereas Vijay is likely to get caught in this polarization since he cannot afford to take sides.

In southern Tamil Nadu, Seeman is again trying to checkmate Vijay using the "losers and gainers" theory in the 10% Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) reservation issue, which impacts the south. Seeman is siding with the "losers," who are the OBCs. Vijay, on the other hand, cannot take a position because he belongs to the Pillai caste, which benefits from the EWS reservation, while a significant portion of his fan base comprises SC and OBC communities. Once again, Vijay will find himself caught in the middle without a clear stance.

In the delta and Kongu regions, Vijay might secure more votes than Seeman. However, overall, nothing can stop Seeman from crossing the 10% vote share. Vijay, on the other hand, is unlikely to get more than 5% of the vote if he contests alone. This is because Vijay primarily focuses on general issues, similar to Kamal Haasan. As a result, his support will be limited to his hardcore fan base and a small portion of educated voters looking for change. If identity politics come into play and some Christians and Pillai castes support Vijay, Vijay could potentially secure around 7%. However, in my opinion, this is unlikely to happen. Vijay is sticking to the same old, time-tested formula of Dravidian and Indian parties, whereas Seeman is strategically focusing on those who have been the losers of that formula—which is what will give Seeman the edge in 2026.

கொட்டுக்காளி

கொட்டுக்காளி படம் சங்க இலக்கியம் தெரிந்தவர்களுக்கு மிக அணுக்கமாக இருக்கும். காதலில் இருக்கும் பெண்ணில் அணங்கு கூடிவிட்டதாக சங்க இலக்கியத்தில் பெண் வீட்டார் நினைப்பர். அதை "முருகயர்தல்" என்று குறிப்பிடுவர். வெறியாட்டு நடத்தினால் பெண் நலம் பெறுவாள் என்பது தொல் நம்பிக்கை. மொத்த படமும் "வேம்பற்றூர்க் கண்ணன் கூத்தனார்" எழுதிய குறுந்தொகை பாடலை நினைவுறுத்துகிறது.

முருகு அயர்ந்து வந்த முதுவாய் வேல!

சினவல் ஓம்புமதி; வினவுவது உடையேன்.

பல்வேறு உருவின் சில் அவிழ் மடையொடு,

சிறுமறி கொன்று இவள் நறுநுதல் நீவி,

வணங்கினை கொடுத்தியாயின், அணங்கிய

விண்தோய் மாமலைச் சிலம்பன்

ஒண்தார் அகலமும் உண்ணுமோ பலியே!

- குறுந்தொகை - 362. தோழி கூற்று

பொருள் - முருகனுக்கு வெறியாட்டு நடத்தும் அறிவு மிகுந்த வேலனே, கோபம் கொள்வதைத் தவிர்ப்பாயாக. உன்னை ஒன்று கேட்க விரும்புகிறேன். பல நிறங்களையுடைய, சிலவகையான சோற்றையுடைய பலியோடு, சிறிய ஆட்டுக்குட்டியைக் கொன்று, இத்தலைவியினது மணமுள்ள நெற்றியைத் தடவி, முருகக் கடவுளை வணங்கிப் பலியாகக் கொடுப்பாயானால், இவளைத் துன்புறுத்திய, வானத்தை அளாவிய பெரிய மலைப்பக்கத்தையுடைய தலைவனது, ஒளிபொருந்திய மாலையை அணிந்த மார்பும், நீ கொடுக்கும் பலியை உண்ணுமோ?

When History Calls: AKD's Rise and the Future of Tamil Aspirations

They said AKD made history, but it is actually the other way around: history made AKD. While he may not have the same level of education, oratorical skill, or crowd-pulling charisma as Rohana Wijeweera, there is one thing I’ve learned from studying history: History doesn't wait for any leader; it makes use of whoever is available. The men of history appear not because they are great, but because they are necessary.

The conditions that once led to the JVP’s emergence—economic hardship, social injustice, and political disillusionment—have persisted throughout the years. However, during Rohana's time, other factors didn’t fall into place, ultimately leading to his demise. In contrast, AKD found himself in a moment where these factors aligned, allowing him to achieve what Wijeweera could not. When the time is right, a leader will emerge. History has its own momentum, often independent of individual leaders. Leaders emerge not because they are the best suited for the role, but because they happen to be in the right place at the right time.

I am always optimistic about the future of Tamils in Sri Lanka because of my understanding of history. Although it may seem that there is no charismatic leader to champion Tamil aspirations today, history has shown us that when the conditions are right, the Tamil community will rise to seize the opportunity for a brighter future.

A Momentary Fix: The True Cost of Ranil's Rise to Power

I can't understand why people are writing emotional thank-you notes to Ranil for "stabilizing the ship." Do Sri Lankans really have such short-term memories? Remember when the Bar Council of Sri Lanka, along with the opposition parties, set a deadline for Gota during the Aragalaya movement to introduce a constitutional amendment to abolish the executive presidency and resign? That was a genuine opportunity for transformative reform. 

Until that demand was met, the opposition decided that no one would take the Prime Minister's post, which kept the pressure on Gota to act. But then RW swooped in at that crucial moment, taking up the Prime Minister's post. By doing so, he relieved the immediate pressure on Gota, effectively halting the momentum for change. Ranil’s choice to prioritize his personal gain allowed the existing power structures to remain intact, transforming what could have been a significant political shift into just a temporary fix.

Being thankful to Ranil is like a bride being kidnapped from her wedding to the perfect guy, forced to marry her abductor, and then feeling grateful because he treated her well after the forced marriage. Sure, he may have made things a bit more comfortable after crashing the big day, but that doesn’t erase the fact that she was supposed to marry Mr. Right, not Mr. Right-Now.

Similarly, while Ranil’s rise to power might seem like it stabilized the immediate chaos, it came at the cost of derailing the real chance for systemic reform and meaningful change. Just because the situation didn’t worsen doesn’t mean we should forgive or celebrate the original betrayal.

The Tamil Vote and the Sinhalese Perspective

People in the South have no business or moral standing to advise Tamils on how to vote in elections. Many in the South may feel that Tamils do not consider themselves Sri Lankan first. For Sinhalese, it is easy to feel Sri Lankan first, as there is no distinction between being Sinhala and being Sri Lankan—the country’s identity, policies, and priorities align exclusively with your own.

In a multi-ethnic country, the country's government should act as a neutral mediator, striving to protect the interests of all communities by building consensus. Unfortunately, since 1956, successive governments in Sri Lanka have positioned themselves solely as protectors of Sinhala Buddhist interests, often at the expense of other ethnicities.

It is not that Tamils do not want to be Sri Lankans first; rather, they have been made to feel Tamil first because the Sri Lankan state has consistently failed to represent, listen to, or protect them. Therefore, the issue isn't that Tamils seek different treatment; it's that they have been treated differently for decades, undermining their sense of belonging within the Sri Lankan identity. 

Don’t ask Tamils to embrace Sri Lankan mainstream politics; instead, challenge your political system to demonstrate through actions that Tamils are also Sri Lankans. When that happens, perceptions will change. Tamil people are not ready to vote based on empty promises, as that is all we have seen from Southern politicians since the 1957 Banda-Selva Pact. 

No Tamils in Singapore identify as Tamil first; they consider themselves Singaporeans. So don’t come to us to tell us how to vote; instead, reflect on how you can ensure that you elect leaders who will truly bring Tamils into the mainstream.

From Violence to Voice: Anura's Journey and Its Lessons for Tamils and Sinhalese

Anura's rise offers crucial political lessons for both Tamils and Sinhalese. The JVP's founder, Rohana Wijeweera, took up arms against the Sri Lankan state to seize power but was defeated in 1989, resulting in around 60,000 Sinhalese lives lost due to the state's brutal crackdown. Today, the JVP has risen through democratic means, demonstrating just how far they’ve come without resorting to violence.

For the Sinhalese, the key takeaway is that battlefield victories, such as those against the Tigers in 2009, are not permanent—just as in 1989—unless the underlying grievances of the Tamil community are addressed through the devolution of powers. For the Tamils, the lesson is that resorting to violence is not a cost-effective path to change; patience and persistence will ultimately turn the tide in your favour. While it may sound absurd to some, what seems impossible today doesn’t mean it will be impossible forever.

For example, when J.R. Jayewardene introduced the new constitution in 1978, one of his key motives was rooted in racism. In the 1977 elections, the SLFP was decimated, while the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) swept the North and East, becoming the second-largest party in parliament. Consequently, TULF Leader Amirthalingam assumed the role of Leader of the Opposition.

Jayewardene couldn’t stand the idea of a Tamil-led opposition. To prevent this from happening again, he introduced the proportional representation system, replacing the first-past-the-post voting system. His assumption was that since SL Tamils made up only 13% of the population, they would never secure enough seats to become the second-largest party under the new proportional system.

However, 37 years later, in 2015, Tamil National Alliance (TNA)—once again became the main opposition party when the UNP and SLFP formed a unity government. This shows that even the most carefully calculated political plans can be upended by time and shifting dynamics.

The non-violent path is the most reliable way to achieve political goals with minimal human cost. While progress through non-violence may be slow—often taking generations—it remains the least destructive option. This approach prevents the immense toll of bloodshed and devastation that violent armed struggles inevitably bring, along with the risk of failing to achieve political goals, as seen in 1989 and 2009. 

With a non-violent path, you can never truly lose; it's only a matter of when and how you will win.

Seeman-Vijay Alliance: Tamil Nadu's Political Crossroads

The 2026 Tamil Nadu election will be a critical one, poised to shape the political landscape for years to come. Vijay faces two options: either contest solo, risking a loss and ending up like Kamal Haasan with around a 5-7% vote share, or join forces with Seeman as a minor partner and support Seeman as the chief ministerial candidate. No existing parties except NTK will risk abandoning cash-rich alliances to join hands with the untested TVK. Vijay needs Seeman more than Seeman needs Vijay.

Vijay's voter base primarily consists of youngsters from underprivileged caste sections and Christians, who are already supporting the DMK alliance. VCK's influence will further consolidate the underprivileged caste sections towards DMK, and a strong anti-BJP stance is attracting more Christian votes to DMK. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that Vijay can break away a considerable amount of votes from these sections to emerge as a strong player single-handedly.

Seeman proved in the 2024 election that he can break in and secure 4.5% of votes from underprivileged caste sections and Christian voters who traditionally support DMK. Given that both Seeman and Vijay share these common voters, joining hands would help consolidate these votes more effectively than if they were to contest alone. 

But there are many problems with this alliance, such as seat sharing, alliance chemistry, Vijay's past history, and campaign financing. Vijay is an untested force, while Seeman is a proven one. We don't know Vijay's actual vote strength, and his fan base alone is definitely not enough to push him to a double-digit vote share. Additionally, there's no guarantee that his fans will vote for him. This uncertainty makes navigating the potential alliance tricky. Vijay may think too highly of himself, but having a huge fan base doesn't guarantee vote share, as proven by Kamal Haasan. Kamal's popularity didn't translate into actual votes. 

The reality of politics often differs from fan support. So seat sharing will be a challenging issue.  Seeman needs to bargain tough, ensuring he doesn't give away too many seats and risk overshadowing his own influence by inflating Vijay's vote share. Unlike Seeman, who has a strong ideological stand, Vijay lacks a clear stance and may join any alliance that accepts him as the chief minister candidate in the future. It's crucial for Seeman to maintain his leverage and not compromise his position. 

Vijay's camp might push for a 50-50 split in seats, which is unreasonable. Seeman has already committed to allocating 150 seats to candidates aged 25-30 in the 2026 elections, indicating that he is not willing to contest in any fewer than that number. This leaves a maximum of 84 seats available for Vijay. Political insiders close to both Seeman and Vijay suggest that Seeman has agreed to allocate only 50 seats to Vijay. If Seeman successfully negotiates this deal and make Vijay accept less than 60 seats, it would be a very good deal for Seeman.

Then there is a problem with alliance chemistry and vote transferability. Seeman's votes will transfer easily to Vijay if Vijay projects Seeman as the Chief Ministerial candidate. However, the bigger question is whether Vijay's votes will transfer to Seeman. Vijay's voters are likely to be diehard fans who want him as Chief Minister, not Deputy Chief Minister. This creates a high risk that they might not support Seeman's candidates and could even work against them to ensure Vijay's emergence with more seats than Seeman.

Another challenge is that Vijay has many fans from linguistic minorities like Telugu, Malayalam, and Kannada speakers living in Tamil Nadu. These fans may not support Seeman because they perceive Seeman's Tamil nationalism as a threat to their existence in the state. We're already witnessing linguistic minority voters from ADMK breaking away and consolidating towards DMK because they see DMK as the only force capable of standing up to Seeman. So, this issue of vote transferability makes it a high-risk venture for Seeman.

Then there are issues with Vijay's history. Seeman is pro-Sri Lankan Tamils and anti-Congress and BJP, whereas Vijay has a proven track record that he doesn't share either of these sentiments. A few months after the end of the Sri Lankan civil war, Vijay went and met Congress leader Rahul Gandhi and expressed his willingness to join Congress if he were to be given the presidency of the Youth Congress, while Seeman had formed the Naam Tamilar movement to oppose the Congress party for their betrayal of Sri Lankan Tamils. Vijay has never shared a single tweet for May 18 Tamil Remembrance Day or November 27, the Maaveral Naal.

Though Vijay is currently portraying himself as anti-BJP, in 2014 he personally met Modi, silently extending support to him against ADMK's Jayalalitha. If opposition parties bring this up, it could be problematic for Seeman to defend because there is no guarantee that Vijay will not form an alliance with Congress or BJP in the future. Such revelations could dent Seeman's credibility. So, this issue also makes it a high-risk venture for Seeman.

Finally, when it comes to campaign finances, Vijay has an edge because he could easily spend 1 crore per constituency to run his campaign if he is contesting around 50-84 seats. Seeman, on the other hand, can't muster that amount of money. Even in the 2024 election, Seeman only spent around 4-5 crores for the entire Tamil Nadu. It is certain that Vijay is not going to finance Seeman's campaigns; he will just ask his party members in those constituencies to cooperate with NTK cadres, and that's all. This puts Seeman at a severe disadvantage. Vijay could emerge with more seats using Seeman's votes and his own financial might, whereas Seeman may not win as many seats. So, this financial issue once again makes it a high-risk venture for Seeman.

Seeman has made very intelligent decisions up to now and has proven himself to be a great political strategist. However, Vijay seems to be his blind spot. Seeman dreams of a Tamil Nadu without the two main ruling Dravidian parties (DMK and ADMK) and national parties (Congress and BJP), parties he believes betrayed Tamils. He envisions two strong Tamil parties emerging to replace DMK and ADMK. 

With the belief that ADMK is destined to fail, Seeman sees himself leading one front while Vijay's party becomes the alternative choice, akin to how DMK and ADMK were once together during Annadurai's time, later splitting and contesting alone, ultimately replacing the Congress and Communist parties, the two choices in Tamil Nadu at that time.  This is Seeman's rationale behind wanting to join forces. He envisions himself as Annadurai and sees Vijay as MGR. Together, he wants his NTK and Vijay's TVK to become the dominant parties ruling Tamil Nadu alternately in the future.  

Considering all these factors, it is very difficult to come to a decision on whether Seeman and Vijay could work together or not. This has more chance of failing than actually working out well for Seeman. There are so many uncertainties, so many ifs and buts. However, missing this option also means Seeman will never fulfil his dream of removing Dravidian dominance in Tamil Nadu. But if he takes this path, there is a risk he might falter and tarnish his credibility, leaving DMK as the dominant force and handing over the alternative force tag to BJP. 

If the Seeman and Vijay combination does happen in 2026, it could either propel Seeman to unprecedented prominence and kickstart his journey as the strong contender for the chief minister post in 2031, or mark the beginning of the end of Seeman's dominance in politics. Only time will tell which way it is going to tilt.